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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. : 
JANA WESTERMAN, : Case No. 960721-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTES 
The text of the following relevant statutes are provided 
in this brief and Addendum B: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 1996) 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-2 (Supp. 1996) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE VICTIM'S INSURANCE COMPANY IS NOT A 
VICTIM UNDER UTAH'S RESTITUTION STATUTE. 
(Responding to State's Brief, p. 6 n.2) 
The State asserts that the Utah Supreme Court's holding 
in State v. Stayer, 706 P.2d 611 (Utah 1985) is controlling. 
Brief of Appellee at 6 n.2. Even though Stayer addressed the 
issue of restitution in a criminal context and held that an 
insurance company can be a victim entitled to restitution, the 
Court's holding is not applicable in this case. Stayer is a 1985 
case which relied upon Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4) (d) (1978 
ed.)(Supp. 1983) for the definition of a victim.1 
1
 "'Victim' is a person who the court determines has suffered 
pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal 
activities." Stayer, at 613 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
201(4) (d) (1978 ed.MSupp. 1983)). 
Since 1983 the restitution statute has been amended. 
Today M[f]or purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as 
defined in Section 77-38-2." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4) (a) (i) 
(Supp. 1996). Section 77-38-2 provides in pertinent part: 
"Victim of a crime" means any person against whom 
the charged crime or conduct is alleged to have 
been perpetrated or attempted by the defendant. . 
Utah Code Ann § 77-38-2(9) (a) (Supp. 1996) (emphasis added). 
The Stayer Court in determining an insurance company 
could be a victim relied on the definition of a "person" as "an 
individual, a public or private corporation, a government, a 
partnership, or an unincorporated association." Stayer, at 613 
(citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4) (d) (1978 ed. (Supp 1983) and 
§ 76-3-601(5)). 
However, upon relating the definition of a "person" with 
the definition of a "victim" in Section 78-38-2, one will find 
the victim's insurance company is not a victim. For example, a 
"'victim of a crime' means any person [insurance company] against 
whom the charged crime or conduct is alleged to have been 
perpetrated or attempted by the defendant. . . . " Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-38-2(a)(a)(Supp. 1996). The defendant, Ms. Westerman, did 
not perpetrate any offense against the victim's insurance 
company. Ms. Westerman only perpetrated an offense against the 
victim, Ms. Doi. 
2 
• * * 
Ms. Westerman relies on her opening brief in response to 
those portions of the State's brief not separately replied to 
here. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Westerman respectfully requests that since the 
victim's insurance company is not entitled to restitution that 
the trial court's restitution order be reversed and remanded for 
further proceedings. 
SUBMITTED this /Zz day of June, 1997. 
3 
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explaining that he thinks the amount ex-
cessive and is enclosing a check for $800 
as payment in full. B, after reading the 
letter, indorses the check and deposits it 
\n his bank for collection. B is bound by 
an accord under which he promises to 
accept payment of the check in satisfac-
tion of A's debt for repairs. The result 
is the same if, before indorsing the 
check, B adds the words "Accepted un-
der protest as part payment." The re-
sult would be different, however, if B's 
claim were liquidated, undisputed and 
matured. 
(Citation omitted.) See Miller v. Prince 
Street Elevator Co., supra, Wilmeth v. 
Lee, Okla., 316 P.2d 614 (1957), and Graf 
fam v. Geronda, Me., 304 A.2d 76 (1973), 
for cases where it was held that a creditor 
cannot avoid the consequences of his exer-
cise of dominion by a declaration that he 
does not assent to the condition attached 
by the debtor. The last cited case succinct-
ly stated the law to be, "The law gave the 
plaintiffs the choice of accepting the check 
on defendant's terms or of returning it." 
[41 Marton contends that under U.C.A., 
1953, § 70A-1-207, it avoided the condition 
placed on the check by Jensen when it 
added the words "not full payment." Mar-
ton asserts that those were words of reser-
vation of rights recognized by section 70A-
1-207. Without deciding whether the 
wording added by Marton could be so inter-
preted, no authority is cited by Marton that 
section 70A-1-207 applies to a "full pay-
ment" check. Of the authorities which we 
have found, the better reasoned hold that 
our section 70A-1-207 (which is identical to 
section 1-207 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code) does not alter the common law rules 
of accord and satisfaction. See Flambeau 
Products Corp. v. Honeywell Information 
Systems, Inc., 116 Wis.2d 95, 341 N.W.2d 
655 (1984); R.A. Reither Construction, 
Inc. v. Wheatland Rural Electric Associa-
tion, Colo.App., 680 P.2d 1342 (1984); 
Stultz Electric Works v. Marine Hydrau-
lic Engineering Co., Me., 484 A.2d 1008 
(1984); Air Van Lines, Inc. v. Buster, su-
pra; Les Schwab Tire Centers of Oregon, 
Inc. v. Ivory Ranch, Inc., 63 Or.App. 364, 
664 P.2d 419 (1983); Connecticut Printers, 
Inc. v. Gus Kroesen, Inc., 134 Cal.App.3d 
54, 184 Cal.Rptr. 436 (1982); Milgram 
Food Stores, Inc. v. Gelco Corp., 550 
F.Supp. 992 (W.D.Mo.1982); Pillow v. 
Thermogas Co. of Walnut Ridge, 6 Ark. 
App. 402, 644 S.W.2d 292 (1982); Eder v. 
Yvette B. Gervey Interiors, Inc., Fla.App., 
407 So.2d 312 (1981); Chancellor, Inc. v. 
Hamilton Appliance Co., 175 N.J .Super. 
345, 418 A.2d 1326 (1980); Brown v. Coast-
al Trucking, Inc., 44 N.C.App. 454, 261 
S.E.2d 266 (1980); State Department of 
Fisheries v. J-Z Sales Corp., 25 Wash.App. 
671, 610 P.2d 390 (1980); and Jahn v. 
Bums, Wyo., 593 P.2d 828 (1979) (noted 
with approval in Recent Developments in 
Utah Law, 1980 Utah L.Rev. 649, 710); 
Rosenthal, Discord and Dissatisfaction: 
Section 1-207 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 78 Colum.L.Rev. 48 (1978)). 
Several courts have stated that if they 
were to construe the statute to limit accord 
and satisfaction, it would jeopardize a con-1 
venient and valuable means of achieving 
informal settlements. Les Schwab Tire 
Centers of Oregon, Inc. v. Ivory Ranch, 
Inc., supra. The law favors compromise in 
order to limit litigation. Accord and satis-
faction serves this goal. Air Van Lines, 
Inc. v. Buster, supra. As stated by Judge 
Corbin in Pillow v. Thermogas Co. of Wah 
nut Ridge, supra, "If we were to decide 
that a creditor can reserve his rights on a 
'payment in full' check, it would seriously* 
circumvent what has been universally acJ 
cepted in the business community as a conJ 
venient means for the resolution of dis-
agreements." 
Our determination that there was an ac-. 
cord and satisfaction obviates the necessity 
of our consideration of any of the otherj 
points raised in either appeal. The judg-j 
ment in favor of the plaintiff is reversed, 
and the case is remanded to the trial court 
to enter judgment in favor of the defend-, 
ant. Costs on appeal are awarded to de* 
fendant. 
HALL, C.J., and DURHAM, J., concur* 
STEWART, J., dissents. 
ZIMMERMAN, J., does not participate 
herein. 
STATE v. STAYER Utah 6 1 1 
Cite M 706 P^d 611 (Utah 1985) 
defendant from raising issue as to restitu-
tion on appeal. 
| « Y NUMBER SYSHM 
^ 
The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
Edgar STAYER, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 20163. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Sept. 19, 1985. 
After plea of no contest to charge of 
arson, defendant was sentenced in the 
Third District Court, Tooele County, Scott 
Daniels, J., and he appealed. The Supreme 
Court held that: (1) trial court properly 
ordered defendant to pay restitution to in-
surance companies; (2) defendant's inten-
tional burning of house acquired by bank 
through trust deed foreclosure involved 
"willful and malicious injury" such that 
debt to bank was not discharged in bank-
ruptcy; and (3) trial court's failure to pro-
vide written reasons for restitution award 
Was harmless error. 
* Affirmed. 
1. Criminal Law <s=»l 208.4(2) 
It is proper for trial court to impose 
restitution unless upon hearing in court 
defendant objects to its imposition. U.C A 
1953, 76-3-201(3)(c), 77-18-1(8). 
2. Criminal Law <3=>1126 
Failure of defendant to furnish tran-
script of sentencing hearing, thereby fail-
ing to show that he objected to imposition 
of restitution or that trial court failed to 
inquire into his ability to pay, precluded 
3. Criminal Law <£=»1208.4(2) 
Defendant convicted of arson was 
properly required to pay restitution to re-
imburse insurance companies, where de-
fendant had monthly income of $2500 and 
monthly expenses totaling $1,420. 
4. Bankruptcy <&=»424 
Defendant's intentional burning of 
house, for which he was convicted of arson, 
involved "willful and malicious injury" 
such that his debt to bank, which had ac-
quired house through trust deed fore-
closure, could not be discharged in bank-
ruptcy. U.C.A. 1953, 76-6-102, 77-18-
1(9); Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 523, 
523(a)(6). 
5. Criminal Law <S=>120M(2) 
"Victim" of crime is person who court 
determines has suffered pecuniary dam-
ages as result of defendant's criminal activ-
ities; that person may be individual, public 
or private corporation, government, part-
nership, or unincorporated association. 
U.C.A. 1953, 76-1-601(5), 76-3-201(4)(d). 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
6. Criminal Law <3=*986(3), 1177 
Trial court should have stated in writ-
ten order its reasons for imposing restitu-
tion upon defendant convicted of arson; 
failure to do so, however, was harmless 
error, in light of ample record evidence 
supporting restitution award. U.C.A. 1953, 
76-3-201(3)(a). 
Barrie A. Vernon, Tooele, for defendant 
and appellant. 
David L. Wilkinson, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and respondent. 
PER CURIAM: 
Defendant appeals from a sentence im-
posed pursuant to a no contest plea to a 
charge of arson, a third degree felony, in 
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violation of U.C.A., 1953, § 76-6-102 (1978 
ed.). 
On April 11, 1983, Citizens Bank ac-
quired defendant's home in Stansbury Park 
through trust deed foreclosure. Four days 
later, while defendant was in the process of 
removing the last of his belongings from 
the home, a fire broke out, causing consid-
erable structural damage to the house. An 
arson investigation disclosed that two fires 
had been deliberately set with liquid accel-
erants. Defendant was charged with arson 
and aggravated arson and pleaded no con-
test to the lesser offense. The greater 
offense was dismissed. On March 27, 
1984, defendant filed his petition in bank-
ruptcy. On July 16 of that year, the trial 
court entered its judgment and order sen-
tencing defendant to 0 to 5 years in the 
Utah State Prison, but staying execution of 
the sentence and placing him on probation 
on certain conditions. One of the condi-
tions imposed was that defendant pay resti-
tution in the amount of $10,477.34 to Farm-
ers Insurance Co. and $12,737.20 to U.S.F. 
& G., both amounts incurred by the insur-
ance companies in repairing the home for 
Citizens Bank, their insured. The rate of 
repayment was to be determined by the 
Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
The principal issue raised by defendant is 
whether the trial court exceeded its author-
ity in ordering defendant to reimburse the 
insurance companies for their loss in com-
pensating Citizens Bank. Defendant 
claims that the trial court erred in not 
inquiring into the ability of defendant to 
make the required restitution, particularly 
in light of his pending bankruptcy. 
[1,2] It is proper for the court to im-
pose restitution unless upon a hearing in 
court the defendant objects to its imposi-
tion. U.C.A., 1953, § 77-18-1(8) (1982 ed.) 
(Supp.1983); § 76-3-201(3)(c) (Supp.1983). 
We have no designation of record on appeal 
and no transcript of the sentencing hear-
ing. We therefore do not know whether 
defendant objected to the imposition of res-
titution or whether the trial court failed to 
inquire into defendant's ability to pay. We 
must decline to consider the issue since it 
must be presumed that it is raised for the 
first time on appeal. 
[3] Even if we were to reach the issue, 
the record before us contains sufficient evi-
dence to support a finding that restitution 
was appropriate. A presentence investiga-
tion report prepared by the Department of 
Adult Probation and Parole is in the record. 
That report contains information on de-
fendant's monthly income, computed at 
$2,500, and monthly expenses totalling 
$1,420. That information would appear to 
furnish a proper basis for the trial court's 
order of restitution. 
[4] Defendant's claim that his debt to 
Citizens Bank was discharged in bankrupt-
cy is without merit. The Utah legislature 
has declared that restitution imposed in 
conjunction with a judgment on a criminal 
offense is considered a debt for "willful 
and malicious injury" for purposes of ex-
ceptions listed to discharge in bankruptcy 
as provided in title 11, section 523, U.S. 
C.A.; U.C.A., 1953, § 77-18-1(9) (1982 ed.) 
(Supp.1983). Defendant's restitution debt 
is nondischargeable under the Bankruptcy 
Code 523(a)(6) because defendant intention-
ally, willfully, and maliciously committed 
arson. U.C.A., 1953, § 76-6-102 (1978 ed.); 
see Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Purk, 28 
B.R. 234 (Bkrtcy.1983) (debtor committed 
waste in violation of mortgage commit-
ment, having set fire to house, and commit-
ted willful, intentional, and malicious act; 
debt was nondischargeable, Bankr.Code, 11 
U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(6)). 
However, we desire to register a caveat 
regarding U.C.A., 1953, § 77-l&-l(9), 
which provides: 
On a plea of guilty or no contest or 
conviction of any crime or offense: 
(9) Restitution imposed under this 
chapter is considered a debt for "willful 
and malicious injury" for purposes of 
exceptions listed to discharge in bank-
ruptcy as provided in Title 11, Section 
523, U.S.C.A. 
(Emphasis added.) This subsection may 
not comport with the Bankruptcy Code. 
Section 523(a)(6) does not broadly except as 
nondischargeable a debt for any crime, but 
STATE v. 
Cite as 706 P.2d I 
only for "willful and malicious injury by 
the debtor to another entity or to the prop-
erty of another entity." Bankr.Code, 11 
U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(6). See United Bank of 
Southgate v. Nelson, 35 Bankr.Rep. 766 
(D.C.1983); In the Matter of Simmons v. 
Simmons, 17 Bankr.Rep. 259 (Bkrtcy.1982). 
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 excepted 
from discharge "liabilities for willful and 
malicious injuries to the person or property 
of another." § 17(a)(8), as amended, for-
merly 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(8). In Tinker v. 
Cohvell, 193 U.S. 473, 24 S.Ct. 505, 48 
L.Ed. 754 (1904), the Supreme Court held 
as nondischargeable under this provision a 
husband's recovery of damages in state 
court against the bankrupt defendant for 
adultery committed with the plaintiff's con-
senting wife. Some courts subsequently 
interpreted the Supreme Court's rationale 
to mean that conduct manifesting reckless 
disregard for the rights of others and caus-
ing damage resulted in nondischargeable 
liability for "willful" injury within the 
meaning of section 17(a)(8). 
Nevertheless, by replacing section 
17(a)(8) of the former act with section 
523(a)(6) of the 1978 code, Congress ex-
pressly intended to overrule legislatively 
the reckless disregard test for nondis-
chargeability. The new statutory language 
excepts from discharge a debt only "for 
willful and malicious injury by the debtor 
to another." § 523(a)(6). Both the House 
and the Senate reports on versions contain-
ing identical language explained that sec-
tion 523(a)(6) excepted from dischargeabili-
ty debts for willful and malicious injury by 
the debtor and that "[ujnder this para-
graph, 'willful' means deliberate or inten-
tional. To the extent that Tinker v. Col-
well held that a less strict standard is 
intended and to the extent that other cases 
have relied on Tinker to apply a 'reckless 
disregard' standard, they are overruled." 
H.R.Rep. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 
365 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code 
Cong. & Ad.News 5787, 5963, 6320-21; 
S.Rep. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 79 
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. 
& Ad.News 5787, 5865. 
As summarized by a leading treatise, the 
effect of the provision of the 1978 code is: 
STAYER Utah 6 1 3 
.11 (Utah 1985) 
In order to fall within the exception of 
section 523(a)(6), the injury to an entity 
or property must have been willful and 
malicious. An injury of an entity or 
property may be malicious injury within 
this provision if it was wrongful and 
without just cause or excessive, even in 
the absence of personal hatred, spite or 
ill-will. The word "willful" means "delib-
erate or intentional," a deliberate and 
intentional act which necessarily leads to 
injury. Therefore, a wrongful act done 
intentionally, which necessarily produces 
harm and is without just cause or excuse, 
may constitute a willful and malicious 
injury. 
3 Collier on Bankruptcy § 523.16, at 523-
118 (15th ed. 1983). 
In the instant case, restitution imposed in 
conjunction with defendant's conviction and 
sentence for arson is a debt for "willful 
and malicious injury" for purposes of ex-
ceptions discharged in bankruptcy. How-
ever, although correct in this fact situation, 
we express concern that the sweep of sec-
tion 77-1-8(9) may be too broad in other 
contexts. 
[5] Finally, defendant claims that there 
was "no direct victim" in this case, where 
the bank had been reimbursed by the insur-
ance companies and the trial court improp-
erly allowed the insurance companies to 
subrogate their nonexisting right of collec-
tion in the state court. We have just stat-
ed that defendant's debt was not discharge-
able. Apart from that, it should be noted 
that a "victim" is a person who the court 
determines has suffered pecuniary dam-
ages as a result of the defendant's criminal 
activities. U.C.A., 1953, § 76-3-20l(4)(d) 
(1978 ed.) (Supp.1983). A "person" may be 
an individual, a public or private corpora-
tion, a government, a partnership, or an 
unincorporated association. Id., § 7 6 - 1 -
601(5). In line with those definitions, the 
trial court properly ascertained the insur-
ance companies as defendant's victims. 
I6J Although defendant has not raised 
the matter, our review of the record indi-
cates that the order does not reflect the 
reasons for the trial court's decision to 
order restitution. Under the relevant stat-
6 1 4 Utah 706 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
ute, if the court determines that restitution 
is either appropriate or inappropriate, it 
shall make the reason for the decision "a 
part of its written order." U.C.A., 1953, 
§ 76-3-201(3)(a) (1978 ed.) (Supp.1983). 
In the case before us, there is ample 
record evidence, from which the trial court 
could have found that restitution was prop-
er. Notwithstanding the mandate of the 
statute that the trial court's reasons be 
included as part of its order, we believe 
that the failure to do so in this case was 
harmless error. Nonetheless, we draw at-
tention to this requirement for future guid-
ance of the sentencing courts. 
Defendant's sentence is affirmed in all 
respects. 
APACHE TANK LINES, INO, a 
corporation, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Thomas R. CHENEY, Personal Repre-
sentative of the Estate of Clifford 
P. Cheney, Defendant and Appellant. 
Thomas R. CHENEY, as Personal Repre-
sentative of the Estate of Clifford P. 
Cheney and Pamela A. Cheney and as 
Co-Conservator and Co-Guardian Ad 
Litem of the minor children Signa Che-
ney and Keenan Cheney, Leslie Skel-
ton, as Co-Conservator and Co-Guardi-
an Ad Litem for Signa Cheney and 
Keenan Cheney, Counterclaimant and 
Cross-Claimant and Appellants, 
v. 
COWBOY OIL COMPANY and LeGrand 
B. Brunson, Cross-Claim Defendants 
and Respondent. 
No. 19573. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Sept. 20, 1985. 
Truck owner brought action for prop-
erty damage and loss of use of tractor and 
trailer against personal representative of 
estate of deceased occupants of automobile 
involved in collision with truck; latter coun-
terclaimed for wrongful death and joined 
truck driver and his employer, who moved 
for summary judgment. The Second Dis-
trict Court, Davis County, J. Duffy Palmer, 
J., granted the motion, and appeal was 
taken. The Supreme Court held that ques-
tions of fact as to whether truck driver was 
negligent in head-on collision accident with 
automobile precluded summary judgment 
on wrongful death counterclaim. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Judgmental80 
Summary judgment should be granted 
with great caution in negligence cases. 
2. Negligence «=»136(9, 14) 
Issues of negligence ordinarily present 
questions of fact to be resolved by fact 
finder; it is only when facts are undisputed 
and but one reasonable conclusion can be 
drawn therefrom that such issues become 
questions of law. 
3. Negligence <s=»136(25) 
Proximate cause is usually a factual 
issue and in most circumstances will not be 
resolved as a matter of law. 
4. Judgment e=>181(33) 
Questions of fact as to whether truck 
driver was negligent in head-on collision' 
accident with automobile precluded summa-
ry judgment in favor of truck driver and! 
his employer in a wrongful death action 
brought as a counterclaim on behalf of 
estate and heirs of deceased occupants of 
automobile. 
Carl E. Malouf, Logan, for appellant.1 
Tim Dalton Dunn, Salt Lake City, for 
respondent. 
PER CURIAM: 
Defendant appeals from a summary 
judgment in favor of LeGrand Brunson and 
APACHE TANK LINES, INC. v. CHENEY Utah 6 1 5 
Cite as 706 P.2d 614 (Utah 1985) 
his employer, Cowboy Oil Co., in a wrong-
ful death action brought as a counterclaim 
on behalf of the estates and heirs of Clif-
ford P. Cheney and Pamela A. Cheney, his 
wife. Brunson was the driver of a tank 
tractor and trailer that collided with the 
Cheneys' car, killing the Cheneys instantly. 
The trial court found Brunson not negli-
gent as a matter of law. We reverse and 
remand for a trial on the merits. 
On March 21, 1980, Brunson arose at 
6:00 a.m., had a bowl of cereal and coffee 
for breakfast, and went on duty at 11:00 
a.m. He drove a loaded tanker truck and 
trailer from Woods Cross, Utah, to Kem-
merer, Wyoming, stopping for a hamburg-
er and coffee between 1:00 and 2:00 p.m. 
He proceeded to Nightengale, about three 
miles southwest of Rock Springs, Wyo-
ming, where the tanks were filled with 
8,820 gallons of drip gas condensate, bring-
ing the total weight of truck and trailer to 
80,000-84,000 lbs. Brunson began his re-
turn trip at 9:00 p.m., stopped at Evanston 
for a couple of beers, stopped at the port of 
entry to help a friend with truck repairs, 
and then began the last leg of his journey 
to Woods Cross. It started to rain and 
turned cold, and by the time Brunson left 
the canyon and turned onto Route 89, he 
knew he was on black ice, because it was 
"slicker than hell" and people passing him 
in the opposite direction had "hollered" at 
him over their CB that the roads were slick 
and icy. 
. At around 1:30 a.m., as Brunson was 
ascending a long hill north of Layton, he 
accelerated to maintain a speed of his truck 
and went from sixth to seventh and then to 
eighth gear. The truck started to slip, and 
Brunson shifted down again to seventh to 
maintain a speed of about 40 m.p.h. It was 
at this point that he first noticed the head-
lights of Cheneys' oncoming car when it 
crested the hill ahead of him. 
ii-i 
i, Here the evidence becomes confusing. 
In his deposition, Brunson testified that the 
headlights of the car suddenly disappeared. 
Without slowing down, Brunson got over 
as far off to the right as he could go, 
thinking he could get away from the car. 
He looked down at his speedometer, which 
read between 40 and 45 m.p.h., and when 
he next looked up, the headlights of the 
Cheney car were right in front of him. His 
truck crushed the car and its occupants 
inside. 
In the statement given to the police, 
Brunson stated the Cheney car made a 
U-turn and entered his lane, and he tried to 
miss it. He amended that statement the 
following morning and added: "Car looked 
like it was making U-turn. Lights were 
aimed towards me when first saw him, 
thought I wonder what he's going to do, 
then I lost lights and almost as quick he 
was in front of me and I hit him." 
Defendant was sued by Apache Tank 
Lines, owner of the Brunson truck, for 
property damage and loss of use of the 
tractor and trailer. Defendant counter-
claimed for wrongful death and joined 
Brunson and Cowboy Oil Co. in this suit. 
Brunson and Cowboy Oil Co. moved for 
summary judgment, claiming that undis-
puted facts established that Brunson was 
not negligent as a matter of law. Defend-
ant opposed the motion on the ground that 
the evidence before the court showed mate-
rial disputed facts from which a jury might 
find Brunson negligent. 
[1-31 In an appeal from a summary 
judgment, we view the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences to be drawn there-
from in the light most favorable to the 
losing party. Hall v. Warren, Utah, 632 
P.2d 848 (1981); accord Blackhurst v. 
Transamerica Insurance Co., Utah, 699 
P.2d 688 (1985). Summary judgment 
should be granted with great caution in 
negligence cases. Williams v. Melby, 
Utah, 699 P.2d 723 (1985). Issues of negli-
gence ordinarily present questions of fact 
to be resolved by the fact finder. It is only 
when the facts are undisputed and but one 
reasonable conclusion can be drawn there-
from that such issues become questions of 
law. FMA Acceptance Co. v. Leatherby 
Insurance Co., Utah, 594 P.2d 1332 (1979). 
Likewise, proximate cause is usually a fac-
tual issue and in most circumstances will 
not be resolved as a matter of law. Uni-
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PART 2 
SENTENCING 
76-3-201. Sentences or combination of sentences allowed 
— Civil penalties — Restitution — Hearing — 
Definitions. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Conviction" includes a: 
(i) judgment of guilt; and 
(ii) plea of guilty. 
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is 
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits 
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responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of 
committing the criminal conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general 
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil 
action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's 
criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of property taken, 
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings 
and medical expenses. 
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary 
damages to a victim, including the accrual of interest from the time of 
sentencing, insured damages, and payment for expenses to a governmen-
tal entity for extradition or transportation and as further defined in 
Subsection (4)(c). 
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has 
suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal 
activities. 
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's 
criminal activities. 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a 
person convicted of an offense to any one of the following sentences or 
combination of them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; 
(e) to life imprisonment; 
(f) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or 
(g) to death. 
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law 
to: 
(i) forfeit property; 
(ii) dissolve a corporation; 
(iii) suspend or cancel a license; 
(iv) permit removal of a person from office; 
(v) cite for contempt; or 
(vi) impose any other civil penalty. 
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence. 
(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted 
in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may 
impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution to 
victims of crime as provided in this subsection, or for conduct for 
which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea 
agreement. For purpqses_oiLrestitution, a victim has the meaning as 
defined in Sectionc^T-38-2 and family member has the meaning as 
defined in Section 77^37-2:—~" 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court 
shall follow the criteria and procedures as provided in Subsections 
(4)£ci-a«d44^41-
(iii) If the court finds the defendant owes restitution, the clerk of 
the court shall enter an order of complete restitution as defined in 
Subsection (8Kb) on the civil judgment docket and provide notice of 
the order to the parties. 
(iv) The order is considered a legal judgment enforceable under the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the person in whose favor the 
76-3-201 CRIMINAL CODE 10 
restitution order is entered may seek enforcement of the restitution 
order in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In 
addition, the Department of Corrections may, on behalf of the person 
in whose favor the restitution order is entered, enforce the restitution 
order as judgment creditor under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(v) If the defendant fails to obey a court order for payment of, 
restitution and the victim or department elects to pursue collection of 
the order by civil process, the victim shall be entitled to recover 
reasonable attorney's fees. 
(vi) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when re-
corded in a judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is 
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action. 
Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentenc-
ing. 
(vii) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting 
the restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the 
remainder of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title 
63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(b) (i) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, 
Chapter 30, Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is 
convicted of criminal activity in the county to which he has been 
returned, the court may, in addition to any other sentence it may 
impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended 
by any governmental entity for the extradition. 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court 
shall consider the criteria in Subsection (4)(c). 
(c) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete 
restitution and court-ordered restitution. 
(U)/Complete restitution means the restitution necessary to com-
pensate a victim for all losses caused by the defendant. 
(ii) Court-ordered restitution means the restitution the court hav-
ing criminal jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the 
criminal sentence at the time of sentencing. 
(iii) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be 
determined as provided in Subsection (8). 
(d) (i) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inap-
propriate under this subsection, the court shall make the reasons for 
the decision a part of the court record. 
(ii) In any civil action brought by a victim to enforce the judgment, 
the defendant shall be entitled to offset any amounts that have been 
paid as part of court-ordered restitution to the victim. 
(iii) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when re-
corded in a judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is 
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action. 
Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentenc-
ing. 
(iv) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting the 
restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the remain-
der of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title 63, 
Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of 
the restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow the 
defendant a full hearing on the issue. 
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(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court 
shall order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transporta-
tion expenses if the defendant was: 
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another 
within the state at governmental expense to resolve pending criminal 
charges; 
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor, and 
(iii) convicted of a crime. 
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of 
governmental transportation expenses if any of the following apply: 
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent 
failure to appear a warrant is issued for an infraction; or 
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order. 
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Sub-
section (a)(i) shall be calculated according to the following schedule: 
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported; 
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported; 
and 
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported, 
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (c)(i) applies to 
each defendant transported regardless of the number of defendants 
actually transported in a single trip. 
(6) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that 
one of three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order 
imposition of the term of middle severity unless there are circumstances in 
aggravation or mitigation of the crime. 
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a 
statement identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or 
presenting additional facts. If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed 
with the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to 
the time set for sentencing. 
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify impo-
sition of the highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in 
the case, the probation officer's report, other reports, including reports 
received under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation 
submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence 
introduced at the sentencing hearing. 
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and 
reasons for imposing the upper or lower term. 
(e) The court in determining a just sentence shall consider sentencing 
guidelines regarding aggravation and mitigation promulgated by the 
Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice. 
(7) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnaping, rape of 
a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse of a child, 
the defendant causes substantial bodily injury to the child, and if the charge is 
set forth in the information or indictment and admitted by the defendant, or 
found true by a judge or jury at trial, the defendant shall be sentenced to the 
highest minimum term in state prison. This subsection takes precedence over 
any conflicting provision of law. 
(8) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense 
shall include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the 
sentencing court or to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A 
victim of an offense, that involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or 
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a pattern of criminal activity, includes any person directly harmed by the 
defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or 
pattern. 
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete 
restitution, the court shall consider all relevant facts, including: 
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage 
to or loss or destruction of property of a victim of the offense; 
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services 
and devices relating to physical, psychiatric, and psychological care, 
including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in accordance with 
a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment; 
the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabili-
tation: and the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the 
offense resulted in bodily injury to a victim; and 
(iii) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense 
resulted in the death of a victim. 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-
ordered restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsec-
tion (b) and: 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that 
payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the other obliga-
tions of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment 
basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of 
restitution and the method of payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitu-
tion inappropriate. 
(d) The court may decline to make an order or may defer entering an 
order of restitution if the court determines that the complication and 
prolongation of the sentencing process, as a result of considering an order 
of restitution under this subsection, substantially outweighs the need to 
provide restitution to the victim. 
History: C. 1953, 76-3-201. e n a c t e d by L. 
1973, c h . 196, § 76-3-201: 1979, ch . 69, § 1; 
1981, ch . 59, 5 1; 1983, ch . 85 . § 1: 1983, ch . 
88, § 3; 1984, ch. 18, § 1: 1986, ch . 156, § 1; 
1987, ch- 107, $ 1; 1990, ch. 81 , $ 1; 1992, ch. 
142, $ 1:1993, ch . 17, § 1; 1994, ch . 13, § 19; 
1995, ch . I l l , 5 1; 1995, ch . 117, $ 1; 1995, 
c h . 301, § 1; 1995, ch . 337, § 1; 1995 (1st 
S.S.), c h . 10, § 1; 1996, ch . 40, § 1; 1996, ch . 
79, § 98; 1996, ch . 241 , §§ 2, 3 . 
A m e n d m e n t Notes . — The 1995 amend-
ment by ch. I l l , effective May 1, 1995, added 
"or for conduct for which the defendant has 
agreed to make restitution as part of a plea 
agreement" and made a related change in Sub-
section (4XaXi). 
The 1995 amendment by ch. 117, effective 
May 1, 1995, inserted "the accrual of interest 
from the time of sentencing"' in Subsection 
(l)(d)f changed "person adjudged guilty"' to "per-
son convicted" in Subsection (2), and added 
Subsections (4)(aKiii; and (4Hd>(iii;. 
The 1995 amendment by ch. 301, effective 
May 1, 1995, added "and as further defined in 
Subsection (4)(c;" at the end of Subsection 
(l)(dV, rewrote Subsection (4) to revise the cri-
teria and procedures for ordering restitution; 
added Subsection (8); and made several stylis-
tic changes. 
The 1995 amendment by ch. 337, effective 
April 29, 1996, added Subsection (2)(g), redes-
ignated former Subsection (2)(g) as Subsection 
(2)(h>, and deleted former Subsection (7Xc), 
requiring sentencing to the aggravated manda-
tory term in cases of substantial bodily injury to 
children during the commission of child kid-
napping or various listed child sexual assaults. 
The 1995 (1st S.S.) amendment, effective 
April 29, 1996, substituted "April 29, 1996" for 
"May 1, 1995" in Subsection (2)(g;. 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 40, effective 
April 29, 1996, deleted former Subsection 
(2Xg;, which read: "on or after April 29.1996, to 
imprisonment at not less than five years and 
which may be for life for an offense under Title 
76, Chapter 5, Par t 4, and Sections 76-5-301.1 
and 76-5-302: or" and redesignated former Sub-
section (2Xh) as Subsection (2Kgr, deleted 
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former Subsection (7), relating to resentencing 
of a defendant subject to mandatory sentencing 
under Subsection 16); and added Subsection (7). 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 79, effective 
April 29, 1996, in Subsection (2Xb) substituted 
•removal or disqualification from" for "removal 
from or disqualification of* and in Subsection 
(4XaXi) added "Section" before "77-37-2." 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 241, §§ 2 and 3, 
effective April 29, 1996, added Subsections 
<4XaKvii)and(4XdXiv). 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
ANALYSIS 
Mitigating factors. 
Cited. 
Mitigating factors. 
In sentencing for conviction of aggravated 
sexual assault, in light of defendant's extensive 
history of violent and antisocial crimes, the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
Compiler's Notes. - Laws 1995, ch. 301, § 
6 provides that the amendments in ch. 117 to 
Subsection (4XaXiii) shall merge into this sec-
tion, as amended by ch. 301, as Subsection 
(4XaXvi). 
Laws 1995, ch. 337 was effective May 1,1995; 
however, § 76-3-201.3 postponed the amend-
ment of this section by ch. 337 until April 29, 
1996. 
trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing 
to list lack of a history of sex-related crimes as 
a mitigating factor. State v. Wright, 262 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 11 (Utah Ct App. 1995). 
Cited in State v. Smith, 280 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 
(Utah 1995); State v. Tenney, 286 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 14 (Utah Ct App. 1996). 
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CHAPTER 38 
RIGHTS OF CRIME VICTIMS ACT 
Section 
77-38-2. 
77-38-3. 
77-38-4. 
77-38-5, 
77-38-6. 
77-38-7. 
Definitions. 
Notification to victims — Initial 
notice, election to receive subse-
quent notices — Form of notice 
— Protected victim information. 
Right to be present and to be 
heard — Control of disruptive 
acts or irrelevant statements — 
Statements trom persons m cus-
tody. 
Application to felonies of the dec-
laration of the rights of crime 
victims. 
Victim's right to privacy. 
Victim's right to a speedy trial. 
Section 
77-38-8. 
77-38-9. 
77-38-10. 
77-38-11. 
77-38-12. 
77-38-14. 
Age-appropriate language at judi-
cial proceedings — Advisor. 
Representative of victim — Court 
designation — Representation 
in cases involving minors — 
Photographs in homicide cases. 
Victim's discretion. 
Enforcement — Appellate Review 
— No right to money damages. 
Construction of this chapter — No 
right to set aside conviction, ad-
judication, admission, or plea — 
Severability clause. 
Notice of expungement petition — 
Victim's right to object. 
77-38-2. Definitions. 
For the purposes of this chapter and the Utah Constitution: 
(1) "Abuse" means treating the crime victim in a manner so as to injure, 
damage, or disparage. 
(2) "Dignity" means treating the crime victim with worthiness, honor, 
and esteem. 
(3) "Fairness" means treating the crime victim reasonably, even-
handedly, and impartially. 
(4) "Harassment" means treating the crime victim in a persistently 
annoying manner. 
(5) "Important criminal justice hearings" or "important juvenile justice 
hearings" means the following proceedings in felony criminal cases or 
cases involving a minor's conduct which would be a felony if committed by 
an adult: 
(a) any preliminary hearing to determine probable cause; 
(b) any court arraignment where practical; 
(c) any court proceeding involving the disposition of charges 
against a defendant or minor or the delay of a previously scheduled 
trial date but not including any unanticipated proceeding to take an 
admission or a plea of guilty as charged to all charges previously filed 
or any plea taken at an initial appearance; 
(d) any court proceeding to determine whether to release a defen-
dant or minor and, if so, under what conditions release may occur, 
excluding any such release determination made at an initial appear-
ance; 
(e) any criminal or delinquency trial, excluding any actions at the 
trial that a court might take in camera, in chambers, or at a sidebar 
conference; 
(f) any court proceeding to determine the disposition of a minor or 
sentence, fine, or restitution of a defendant or to modify any disposi-
tion of a minor or sentence, fine, or restitution of a defendant; and 
(g) any public hearing concerning whether to grant a defendant or 
minor parole or other form of discretionary release from confinement. 
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(6) "Reliable information" means information worthy of confidence, 
including any information whose use at sentencing is permitted by the 
United States Constitution. 
(7) "Representative of a victim" means a person who is designated by 
the victim or designated by the court and who represents the victim in the 
best interests of the victim. 
(8) "Respect" means treating the crime victim with regard and value. 
(9) (a) "Victim of a crime" means any person against whom the charged 
crime or conduct is alleged to have been perpetrated or attempted by 
the defendant or minor personally or as a party to the offense or 
conduct or. in the discretion of the court, against whom a related crime 
or act is alleged to have been perpetrated or attempted, unless the 
natural person is the accused or appears to be accountable or 
otherwise criminally responsible for or criminally involved in the 
crime or conduct or a crime or act arising from the same conduct, 
criminal episode, or plan as the crime is defined under the laws of this 
state. 
(b) For purposes of the right to be present, "victim of a crime" does 
not mean any person who is in custody as a pretrial detainee, as a 
prisoner following conviction for an offense, or as a juvenile who has 
committed an act that would be an offense if committed by an adult, 
or who is in custody for mental or psychological treatment. 
(c) For purposes of the right to be present and heard at a public 
hearing as provided in Subsection 77-38-2(5Kg) and the right to notice 
as provided in Subsection 77-38-3(7)(a), "victim of a crime" includes 
any victim originally named in the allegation of criminal conduct who 
is not a victim of the offense to which the defendant entered a 
negotiated plea of guilty. 
History: C. 1953, 77-38-2, enacted by L. 
1994, ch. 198, § 3: 1995, ch. 352, § 8; 1996, 
ch. 79, § 106; 1996, ch. 216, § 1; 1996, ch. 
241, § 4. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend-
ment, effective May 1, 1995, added Subsections 
(1) to (4) and (7), redesignating the other sub-
sections m alphabetical order, in Subsection 
(5), added "important juvenile justice hearings"' 
as a term defined and added related references 
throughout the subsection to make the defini-
tion applicable to minors; in Subsection (5/'c;, 
inserted "an admission or"; and in Subsection 
(9)(a), added "or conduct" and "or act" in several 
places and "or minor" after "defendant." 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 79, effective 
April 29, 1996, redesignated former Subsec-
tions (7) and (8) as Subsections (8) and (7). 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 216, effective 
April 29, 1996. added Subsection i9)(c>. 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 241, effective 
April 29, 1996, deleted "natural" before "person 
against" in Subsection (9)(aj. 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
